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OME HAVE DOUBTED that, when we appropriately sift through our 
catalog of what there is, moral properties will have what it takes to re-
main (e.g., Mackie 1977; Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 1990; Joyce 2001). In 
one well-known iteration of this challenge, Gilbert Harman (1977) 
questions the explanatory utility of moral properties. It seems, he suggested, 
that we may be able to slim down our ontological commitments without ex-
planatory loss by doing away with moral properties.  
This challenge has given rise to a compelling form of nonreductive mor-
al naturalism – sometimes called Cornell realism. Cornell realists accept Har-
man’s challenge and respond by arguing that moral properties have earned a 
place in our ontology in virtue of the indispensable role they play in the best 
explanation of various phenomena (Sturgeon 1988, 2006; Brink 1989; Sayre-
McCord 1988).1 
This inventive line of response has considerable appeal. However, its vi-
ability depends importantly on a particular thesis about the semantics of thick 
concepts. Unfortunately for Cornell realists, Väyrynen’s (2013) Pragmatic 
View of thick concepts enjoys considerable support and is hostile to the 
strongest moral explanations currently on offer. If concepts like COURA-
GEOUS, KIND, LEWD, OPPRESSIVE and so on are not inherently evaluative, 
then the most plausible moral explanations Cornell realists have offered can-
not do the work they are meant to. Thus, in the absence of strong reasons to 
reject the Pragmatic View, Cornell realism is significantly weakened. In par-
ticular, I will argue, if Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View of thick concepts is cor-
rect, then Cornell realists must either endorse reductive naturalism in order 
to retain their most credible moral explanations, or they must restrict moral 
explanations to their least plausible examples – namely those that employ 
thin concepts such as GOOD and RIGHT. Neither choice bodes well for their 
view. 
 
1. Ontological Rights for Moral Properties? 
 
In his original presentation of the explanatory challenge, Harman (1977) asks 
us to contrast two cases. In the first, Jane sees Albert pouring gasoline on a 
cat and then lighting it on fire for fun. This observation leads Jane to nonin-
ferentially form the belief that Albert has done something wrong.2 In the se-
                                                
1 Richard Boyd is often characterized as a Cornell realist. I avoid his work here since his ar-
guments do not center on the sorts of moral explanations that I will be criticizing, but see 
e.g., Boyd 1988, 2003a, 2003b. 
2 Jane and Albert actually do not enter the scene until Harman (1986), but I use them here 
for ease of exposition. 
S 
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cond case, a physicist observes a vapor trail in a cloud chamber and from this 
observation noninferentially forms the belief that a proton has gone by. Ac-
cording to Harman, it appears that, while we need to appeal to protons in 
order to explain the observation of the physicist, we need not appeal to the 
wrongness of igniting cats in order to explain Jane’s observation about Al-
bert’s action. It seems that facts about Jane’s ethical sensibility and her beliefs 
about what Albert was doing are all that is required to explain her observa-
tion. Indeed, given those facts, it looks like Jane would make the same judg-
ment whether or not Albert’s act was wrong. So perhaps our moral judg-
ments do not constitute evidence for moral facts. 
Sturgeon (1988) objects that this argument relies on an illicit assumption. 
Only one who already accepts moral skepticism will find Harman’s contrast 
convincing, because the dissimilarity between the two cases can only be mo-
tivated by assuming that the physicist’s theory is roughly true and that Jane’s 
moral views are roughly false. For, if the physicist’s theory of particles is mis-
taken, then we would not need to appeal to protons in order to account for her 
observation (cf. Brink 1989: 185-86). Thus, in order to formulate a challenge 
that is convincing to the realist, Harman would need to show that moral facts 
are explanatorily irrelevant even if commonsense moral beliefs are roughly 
true. And, Sturgeon maintains, this simply is not plausible. If Jane’s moral 
views are roughly true, then lighting cats on fire for fun is wrong. Since the 
moral supervenes on the natural, Albert would have needed to do something 
different to the cat (e.g., pour water on it to clean its fur) in order for his act 
not to be wrong. And if Jane observed that happening, then she would not 
have judged that what Albert did was wrong. So it is not the case that she 
would have judged his act wrong regardless of whether or not it was wrong. 
And, in general, it seems that our moral judgments counterfactually depend 
on the moral facts in this way, which suggests that such facts are indeed rele-
vant to the explanation of our judgments.3 
Now, it is important to remember that Harman himself is not a moral 
skeptic.4 He answers his explanatory challenge by motivating a version of re-
ductive naturalism according to which moral properties reduce to certain 
kinds of descriptive properties (e.g., Harman 1977, ch. 11). Thus he thinks 
that moral properties in fact do figure in our best explanations, because they 
are identical to certain explanatorily relevant properties that initially appear 
less problematic. Sturgeon and the other Cornell realists, however, wish to 
maintain a version of naturalism according to which moral properties are ex-
planatorily relevant and constituted by nonmoral properties, but cannot be 
reduced to or identified with nonmoral properties. 
                                                
3 In support, Sturgeon (1988: 245) proposes the following counterfactual test: “[I]f a particu-
lar assumption is completely irrelevant to the explanation of a certain fact, then the fact 
would have obtained, and we could have explained it just as well, even if the assumption had 
been false.” It is known that this test has problems, but we need not sort them out here. 
4 Although he is a moral relativist, he denies that this amounts to skepticism. 
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A central point of contention between these positions revolves around 
the distinction between descriptive and evaluative vocabulary. What is the 
difference between these vocabularies? There is no straightforward answer 
and I do not intend to propose an analysis of evaluative language here, but it 
will be useful to have the following criterion from Väyrynen (2013: 55) in the 
background: 
 
[A] thick term or a concept T is inherently evaluative in meaning if literal uses of 
sentences of the form x is T in normal contexts entail, as a conceptual matter or in 
virtue of a semantic rule, that x is good or bad (depending on T) in a certain way – 
where “a semantic rule” covers also such further semantic properties as conven-
tional implicature and semantic presupposition. 
 
Reductive naturalists claim that the properties ascribed by evaluative 
predicates – call them evaluative properties – are identical to some of the proper-
ties ascribed by descriptive predicates – call them descriptive properties.5 Cornell 
realists are characterized by the denial of this claim: According to them, the 
properties ascribed by our evaluative vocabulary are not reducible (analytical-
ly or synthetically) to the properties ascribed by some subset of our descrip-
tive vocabulary.6 Thus, the present debate is appropriately conceived of as 
centering on explanations that employ evaluative terms and concepts. The 
key question is whether or not the properties ascribed by those kinds of 
terms and concepts can be reduced to the properties ascribed by descriptive 
terms and concepts.7 
In the sense relevant here, reductions identify one kind of thing with an-
other kind of thing. Such an identification is appropriate when it turns out 
that one and the same thing (or property) is denoted by two different predi-
cates, e.g., water and H2O. However sometimes it is inappropriate to pursue 
reductive identifications, such as reducing types of psychological states to 
types of neurophysiological states (Fodor 1974). For physicalists, instances of 
e.g., pain are (typically) identical to some instance of a neurophysiological 
state. However, the fact that the same psychological state can be realized in a 
                                                
5 See e.g., Jackson and Pettit (1996: 83), Jackson (1998: 123), Railton (1986: 205), Miller 
(2013: 143-44). 
6 For example, in resisting reductive naturalism, Sayre-McCord argues that certain moral 
explanations “rely on moral concepts that identify characteristics common to people, actions 
and institutions that are uncapturable with finer-grained or differently structured categories” 
(1988: 276). Along similar lines, Sturgeon contrasts his preferred version of naturalism with 
the reductive naturalist’s view that “we either are or will be able to say, in entirely nonmoral 
terms, exactly which natural properties moral terms refer to” in virtue of possessing natural-
istic reductive definitions (1988: 243). Cf. Brink (1989: 9): “A nonreductive form of ethical 
naturalism claims that moral facts and properties are constituted by, and so supervene upon 
… natural and social scientific facts and properties even if moral terms are not definable by 
natural terms.” See also Brink (1989: 156-59) and Jackson (1998: 144). 
7 I will follow Väyrynen (2013: 44-55) in taking the content of our terms to be related to the 
content of our concepts in such a way that findings about the semantics of our terms con-
strain the semantics of our concepts. 
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variety of different ways makes it improper to reduce the type of psychologi-
cal state ascribed by “pain” to some particular type of state ascribable using 
terms available in the vocabulary of neurophysiology. Pain is a natural kind 
about which interesting counterfactual-supporting generalizations can be 
made. However, its various instances are not homogeneous at the level of 
neurophysiology and thus cannot be identified with the natural kinds posited 
by neurophysiology, despite the fact that such states supervene on and are 
constituted by neurophysiological states. 
In what follows, I want to concede a lot of ground to the Cornell realists 
for the sake of argument. So while it may sound question begging against 
e.g., compositional nihilists and psychological reductionists, I will accept the 
antireductionist attitude just outlined. Toward that end, I hope I will be per-
mitted here to use the label reductive mistakes for cases in which a particular 
view entails a reductive error, such as type-type reductionism about psycho-
logical and neurophysiological states. In contrast, I will use the label objection-
able reductionism for views that imply that everything – from DNA to beliefs to 
water – reduces to (or can be eliminated in favor of) the fundamental con-
stituents of the universe (e.g., particles, strings or whatever). With this in 
place, we return to the exchange between Harman and the Cornell realists. 
 
2. Cornell Realism and Moral Explanations 
 
In reply to Harman’s challenge of explanatory impotence, Cornell realists 
have tried to motivate nonreductive naturalism about moral properties by 
arguing that we are familiar with a range of robust, irreducibly moral explana-
tions of various phenomena. Here are some putative examples: 
 
(1) Honesty engenders trust. 
(2) Kindness encourages friendship. 
(3) Mother Teresa’s goodness won her a Nobel Prize. 
(4) People are starving unnecessarily because of the selfishness of others. 
(5) Racial oppression caused political instability and social protest in apartheid 
South Africa. 
(6) Hitler instigated and oversaw the deaths of millions of persons because he was 
morally depraved. 
(7) Woodworth spent his time and energy arranging his own conveniences rather 
than organizing an effective search for the missing people because he was no 
damn good.8 
 
These moral explanations, it is claimed, appeal to irreducible moral properties 
and thus motivate a nonreductive view about moral properties that is analo-
gous to the case for nonreductionism about psychological states. The multi-
ple realizability of moral properties like kindness, oppression and goodness 
                                                
8 (1)-(4) come from Sayre-McCord (1988: 275-76); (5) comes from Brink (1989: 187); (6) and 
(7) come from Sturgeon (1988: 234, 249). All three authors explicitly draw analogies with the 
case for nonreductionism about psychological states. 
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suggests that they cannot be reduced to descriptive properties. Thus, we 
should think of them as having the same ontological status as psychological 
states, DNA and other irreducible entities posited by the special sciences. 
Critics of this view have tended to deny the truth of the explanations of-
fered in (1)-(7) (but see Sinclair 2011). For example, Leiter (2001) denies that 
honesty’s engendering trust is a better explanation than the perception of hon-
esty’s engendering trust (cf. Quinn 1986). He also suggests (2001: 94) that (6) 
is nothing more than a restatement of what needs to be explained. Along 
similar lines, Blackburn (1993:  204-05) and Sinhababu (unpublished manu-
script) argue that psychological explanations appealing to our attitudes toward 
social arrangements and others’ behavior tend to be better than the compet-
ing moral explanations. 
These sorts of replies can seem somewhat strained, bordering on reduc-
tive mistakes. For example, why did people think there was racial oppression 
in apartheid South Africa? Plausibly, because there was racial oppression in 
apartheid South Africa (cf. Brink 1989: 187-89; Majors 2003). 
Other attempts to deny the truth of these explanatory claims have led 
authors close to endorsing objectionable reductionism. For example, Thom-
son (1996) argues that evaluative properties like rudeness are epiphenomenal: 
All the causal-explanatory work being done in appeals to rudeness is accom-
plished by the subvening descriptive properties on which rudeness super-
venes (cf. Blackburn 1993: 205-06). Along similar lines, Miller (2013, ch. 8) 
claims that moral properties appear to figure in some of our best explana-
tions only due to our epistemic limitations. If we did not suffer from such 
limitations, then we could dispense with the higher-level properties and 
would only require appeals to the microstructural facts about these cases. 
As Sturgeon (1986, 1998, 2006) points out, the principles behind these 
argumentative strategies would require that we also dispense with unobjec-
tionable entities such as psychological states and DNA (see also Majors 2003, 
2007; Nelson 2006; cf. Miller 2009). For example, one might analogously ar-
gue that all of the causal-explanatory work being done in appeals to psycho-
logical states is really being done by the subvening physical states on which 
psychological states supervene. But it seems that at least Thomson does not 
desire to jettison psychological states and the like from her ontology. Some-
thing must be going wrong. 
In what follows, I present an objection to the moral explanations of 
Cornell realists that does not suffer from the problem of objectionable re-
ductionism. I will even allow that kindness really does encourage friendship, 
and oppression really does cause protest and political instability. Further-
more, I will grant Sturgeon the assumption that our considered moral judg-
ments are roughly true: Ceteris paribus, torture is wrong, charity is laudable and 
kindness is good. Even with these concessions, we can spot a serious weak-
ness in these arguments by paying careful attention to recent work on thick 
ethical concepts – to which we now turn. 
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3. The Pragmatic View of Thick Concepts 
 
The distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts can be sketched as 
follows. Thin concepts – which include GOOD, BAD, RIGHT, WRONG – se-
mantically convey evaluations of actions, characters and states of affairs, but 
do not contain any further descriptive information. As Elstein and Hurka 
explain (2009: 516): 
 
The mark of a thin concept like “right” is that it says nothing about what other 
properties an item falling under it has … [W]hile the claim “x is right” says or im-
plies that x has some right-making properties, it says nothing about what in particu-
lar they are.9  
 
In contrast, thick terms and concepts are often characterized as somehow 
holding together description and evaluation (Williams 1985, chs. 7-8). Para-
digmatic examples of thick concepts include COURAGIOUS, CRUEL, BRUTAL, 
CALLOUS, KIND, HONEST, LEWD and OPPRESSIVE. The characteristic fea-
ture of these concepts is that they seem to simultaneously describe and eval-
uate. For example, someone who is callous is not just bad, but bad in a cer-
tain way (perhaps bad in virtue of being indifferent to the well-being of oth-
ers). 
Accounts of thick concepts have tended to cluster into two categories, 
which we can follow Väyrynen (2013: 11-15) in calling separabilism and insepa-
rabilism. Separabilists claim that it is possible – at least in principle – to isolate 
the descriptive from the evaluative components of these concepts (Elstein 
and Hurka 2009; Miller 2013: 240-52). Inseparabilist accounts maintain that 
the evaluative and descriptive aspects of thick concepts cannot be disentan-
gled from one another (Williams 1985; Kirchin 2010; Roberts 2011). Despite 
their disagreements, both separabilists and inseparabilists tend to endorse the 
following thesis: 
 
Inherently Evaluative: The meanings of thick terms and concepts somehow or 
other contain evaluation.10 
 
This would be true if the evaluations were part of the literal semantic content 
of thick terms and concepts, or if the evaluations were something like seman-
tic presuppositions or conventional implicatures (cf. Väyrynen’s characteriza-
tion of evaluative predicates in § 1). The question for those who endorse In-
herently Evaluative is how to best analyze the relationship between the eval-
uative and descriptive semantic content of these terms and concepts. 
However, as Väyrynen (2013) observes, this thesis has received limited 
critical scrutiny (but see Blackburn 1992; Kyle 2013). In fact, he argues, if we 
                                                
9 Korsgaard (1996: 71) offers a nice characterization of thin concepts along similar lines: 
“Pure in their normativity, they are like those little gold stars you can stick on anything.” 
10 Väyrynen (2013: 9). 
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apply standard techniques from linguistics and the philosophy of language 
for assessing the semantic content of our terms, it turns out that there are 
very good reasons for rejecting Inherently Evaluative. Consequently, 
Väyrynen advocates a Pragmatic View of thick terms and concepts according 
to which the evaluative information conveyed by thick terms arises from 
pragmatic conversational mechanisms that rely on the shared evaluative 
backgrounds of speakers within a linguistic community. 
In what follows, I will be relying heavily on this account. The claim will 
be that the Pragmatic View deflates the appeal of Cornell realism by disarm-
ing the most persuasive moral explanations that have been proposed. In or-
der to avoid this, Cornell realists need to provide a plausible alternative to 
Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View.11 Since there is not room for a full defense of 
Väyrynen’s (admittedly controversial) account here, I will simply assume that 
it is roughly true and explore its consequences. While the merits of the 
Pragmatic View must be assessed on the merits of the arguments in 
Väyrynen’s book, I will briefly motivate it before returning to the moral ex-
planations offered by the Cornell realists (see also Väyrynen 2009, 2012; 
Bedke 2014). 
One of Väyrynen’s central arguments involves appealing to the method 
of assessing the semantic content of an utterance by observing the way its 
implications project. Here is the characterization of projection he uses: “An 
implication projects if and only if it survives as an utterance implication when 
the expression that triggers the implication occurs under the syntactic scope 
of an entailment-canceling operator” (Simons et al. 2010: 309; see Väyrynen 
2013: 60). The idea is that, if certain implications of an utterance project, 
then they are not conceptual or semantic entailments of the utterance. To 
illustrate, Väyrynen uses the following example (2013: 60): 
 
(8) Anna regrets drinking instant coffee this morning. 
a. Anna has negative feelings about drinking instant coffee this morning. 
b. Anna drank instant coffee this morning. 
 
Here, both (8a) and (8b) are implications of (8).  
Now watch what happens when the expression in (8) is embedded with-
in the scope of various entailment-canceling operators (e.g., questions, nega-
tion, possibility modals, antecedents of conditionals): 
 
(9) a. Does Anna regret drinking instant coffee this morning? 
b. Anna doesn’t regret drinking instant coffee this morning. 
c. Anna might regret drinking instant coffee this morning. 
d. If Anna regrets drinking instant coffee this morning, then my dislike of in-
stant coffee is vindicated. 
 
                                                
11 Ken Shockley has suggested to me that perhaps this sort of argument might be able to go 
through even if the Pragmatic View is false but separabilism is true. I do not pursue that 
approach here, but see Quinn (1986: 534-35). 
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As Väyrynen points out, the implication in (8b) is still present in (9a)–(9d), all 
of which have (8) embedded within the scope of entailment-canceling opera-
tors. However, notice that the implication in (8a) does not remain in any of 
these situations. The basic idea is that, whereas (8b) is not a conceptual or 
semantic entailment of (8), (8a) is. If you cancel the entailments of (8) you 
cancel (8a), but (8b) still sticks around. A plausible explanation is that (8b) is 
neither part of the literal meaning of (8) nor entailed by it, but rather a presup-
position behind the utterance in (8).12 
Now, what if we apply this test to thick terms and concepts? Consider 
the term “lewd.” Väyrynen (2013: 62) asks us to imagine a conversation be-
tween two individuals who sometimes describe things as lewd and believe 
that those things are bad in a certain way in virtue of their lewdness. These 
two know that they both share this attitude toward lewd acts, and that people 
typically only use the word “lewd” when they associate negative evaluations 
with acts that transgress conventional boundaries on sexual display. Suppose 
that they are discussing a show that will be in town next week and the first 
utters (10), to which the second replies with (11): 
 
(10) Madonna’s stage show is lewd. 
(11) Nah, Madonna’s show isn’t lewd. 
 
In this context, Väyrynen points out, we naturally hear (11) as denying that 
there is sufficient transgressive sexual display for the show to be labeled as 
lewd. If asked to elaborate, the second person might say: 
 
(12) Madonna’s show is sexually insinuating alright, but it’s not lewd because no 
private parts are exposed. 
 
However, notice that (11) does not seem to be denying either of the follow-
ing: 
 
(13) Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in a 
certain way. 
(14) If Madonna’s show involves overt display of sexuality that transgresses con-
ventional boundaries, then it is bad in a certain way. 
 
It seems natural to suppose that the utterer of (11) still endorses (13) and 
(14). The fact that these evaluations associated with “lewd” are not canceled 
when (10) gets embedded in entailment-canceling contexts (such as in (11)) 
suggests that they project. And this, Väyrynen argues, provides strong rea-
sons for thinking that the evaluations in (13) and (14) are not part of the cen-
tral point of using the word “lewd,” but rather are backgrounded features of 
utterances that employ it. 
                                                
12 While projection is often used to test for presupposition, there are other kinds of utterance 
implications that project as well (see Simons et al. 2010). This will be important below. 
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On this interpretation, the evaluations are not-at-issue with respect to 
the question under discussion when speakers describe things using “lewd” 
and other thick terms, since this is what projection seems to test for (Simons 
et al. 2010). Furthermore, the fact that these evaluations are not semantic en-
tailments of utterances containing “lewd” counts against the view that they 
are part of the meaning of “lewd.” However, several possible accounts could 
satisfy Inherently Evaluative, and not all of them treat the evaluative content 
of thick concepts as semantic entailments. It is possible to defend Inherently 
Evaluative by treating the evaluations as conventional implicatures or seman-
tic presuppositions (§ 2). Thus the projection argument only partially sup-
ports Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View. 
Another argumentative thread that animates Väyrynen’s approach is the 
observation that it is not incoherent to challenge the evaluations that are usu-
ally associated with many thick terms and concepts. For example, it is possi-
ble to wonder whether selfishness is bad, and Gordon Gekko is plausibly 
regarded as exhibiting a normative failing, rather than conceptual confusion, 
when he asserts that greed is good. This is indicative of the fact that the eval-
uations commonly associated with thick terms appear to be defeasible in var-
ious contexts. For example, Väyrynen (2013: 70) suggests that someone who 
objects to the evaluations in (13) and (14) associated with “lewd” might reply 
to the speaker in (10) by saying: 
 
(15) Whether or not Madonna’s show is lewd, it’s not bad in any way distinctive of 
explicit sexual display. 
 
These observations are not what one would expect if the evaluations associ-
ated with thick terms and concepts were part of their meaning. And indeed, 
this defeasibility of the evaluative implications associated with thick terms 
tells against interpreting them as some other semantic property, such as con-
ventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions (Väyrynen 2013: 103-05, 
109-16). For example, contrast (15) with the following:  
 
(16) #Whether or not Anna drank instant coffee this morning, we can truthfully 
say that Anna regrets drinking instant coffee this morning.13 
 
Because the implication in (8b) is plausibly regarded as a semantic presuppo-
sition of (8), it cannot be felicitously suspended in the way that (15) suspends 
the evaluative implications of (10). 
Väyrynen argues that by reviewing considerations such as these, we can 
see that the most plausible account of thick terms and concepts is that the 
evaluations they are used to convey are not part of their semantic meaning, 
but instead arise pragmatically from the evaluative backgrounds shared by 
speakers in a linguistic community. The idea is that those who are interested 
in classifying people using “chaste” or “unchaste,” for example, are typically 
                                                
13 Väyrynen 2013: 115. 
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embedded within a culture in which chastity is held to be evaluatively signifi-
cant. When they engage in such categorization, they typically do so in the 
context of communicating with others who share a similar evaluative back-
ground. Mutual awareness of this explains why the evaluations associated 
with thick terms and concepts are typically not-at-issue in utterances contain-
ing thick terms (Väyrynen 2013: 128ff).14 
To illustrate, consider an example that does not contain a thick evalua-
tive term: 
 
(17) Did you hear about Jim? He feeds his kids GMOs every day. 
 
The assertion in the second sentence of (17) is true just in case Jim feeds his 
kids GMOs every day. However, if this is said by someone who is known to 
be suspicious of GMOs, and is said to someone whom the speaker knows to 
be suspicious of GMOs, the speaker is able to convey a negative appraisal of 
Jim’s behavior through the utterance. This appraisal is not part of the truth-
conditions of the utterance or the meaning of “GMOs,” but rather arises 
from mutual knowledge of these shared evaluative attitudes toward GMOs. 
According to the Pragmatic View, the evaluations conveyed by thick terms 
arise pragmatically in a similar manner. 
I wish to highlight two features of this account. First, the Pragmatic 
View is meant to apply to most paradigmatic terms and concepts that can be 
classified as thick. Väyrynen (2013: 150-55) acknowledges that it is unclear 
how to treat pejoratives, but it is also unclear that they will have much signif-
icance in the present context. He also grants that locutions such as “a good 
x” may be thick and inherently evaluative in some way. This class may be 
more significant, but for simplicity I will temporarily assume that the Prag-
matic View applies to all thick terms and concepts, returning to “a good x” 
later. The second thing to note is this: The fact that the evaluations conveyed 
by thick terms are not part of their semantic meaning leads to the view that 
these terms may not have an empty extension even if the evaluations they are 
typically used to convey are not true. For example, if Gibbard (1992) is cor-
rect that things are not bad in any way in virtue of involving sexual displays 
that transgress conventional boundaries, such acts may still be lewd neverthe-
less. Since the evaluations that speakers typically associate with thick terms 
are not part of their meaning or truth-conditions, incorrect evaluations do 
not render thick terms empty. 
With the Pragmatic View in place, we now return to moral explanations. 
                                                
14 This account also explains why, even if the evaluations are not part of the literal meaning 
of thick terms, it can still be misleading for a speaker to employ certain words in certain con-
texts, since this can be taken as a signal that the speaker endorses the relevant evaluative 
outlook. For example, imagine someone who is evaluatively indifferent toward observing 
Judaic dietary law asking their waiter whether their meal is kosher. Typically, non-Jews do 
not worry about categorizing their meals using “kosher,” even though they can accurately 
describe things with that word. 
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4. Thick Explanations 
 
This approach to thick terms and concepts opens up room for a novel and 
serious objection to Cornell realism. Recall the putative moral explanations 
we entertained above: 
 
(1) Honesty engenders trust. 
(2) Kindness encourages friendship. 
(3) Mother Teresa’s goodness won her a Nobel Prize. 
(4) People are starving unnecessarily because of the selfishness of others. 
(5) Racial oppression caused political instability and social protest in apartheid 
South Africa. 
(6) Hitler instigated and oversaw the deaths of millions of persons because he was 
morally depraved. 
(7) Woodworth spent his time and energy arranging his own conveniences rather 
than organizing an effective search for the missing people because he was no 
damn good. 
 
As you can see, some of these explanations – (1), (2), (4) and (5) – employ 
thick concepts, while the others – (3), (6) and (7) – employ thin concepts.15 
Remember that reductionists claim that the properties ascribed by evalu-
ative vocabulary can be reduced to the properties ascribed by descriptive vo-
cabulary. On the Pragmatic View, thick terms are part of our descriptive vo-
cabulary. Thus, we can see that the descriptive property ascribed by the de-
scriptive thick term “honesty” is what is appealed to in (1). But then it seems 
that (1) is no moral explanation. For one may accept that (1) is true (as we will 
here for the sake of argument) and accept that honesty is good (as we will 
here for the sake of argument), and yet fail to be committed to the existence 
of irreducible moral properties, since the goodness of honesty is not built 
into the meaning of “honesty.” 
It may be true that honesty is not reducible to lower-level properties. 
But reductive naturalists (e.g., Jackson, Railton, Harman) do not claim that 
moral properties reduce to the fundamental constituents of physics. That is, 
none of them endorse objectionable reductionism. For example, a hedonist 
who thinks that the good reduces to pleasure is not thereby endorsing objec-
tionable reductionism – for pleasure is an irreducible psychological state. 
Thus, the fact that honesty is irreducible does not by itself entail that it is an 
irreducible moral property. 
On the Pragmatic View, a relevant analog to (1) would be the claim that 
an explanation employing “neocortical column” can secure ontological status 
for psychological states. Although neocortical columns realize psychological 
states and are not reducible to entities describable using the vocabulary of 
physics, “neocortical column” is part of our neurophysiological vocabulary. 
                                                
15 At least on first glance. I do not know what moral depravity is other than a condition of 
being very bad morally, but I will avoid this particular example in what follows. 
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Thus, such explanations are not even candidates for supporting irreducible 
psychological states. 
To see how this works, consider another, analogous case. At a concert in 
Miami in 1969, Jim Morrison was arrested and accused of exposing himself 
and simulating oral sex with the guitarist of The Doors while on stage (Hop-
kins 1995). Although some have disputed his guilt, assume the story is true. 
This suggests the following explanation: 
 
(18) Jim Morrison’s lewd behavior led to his arrest. 
 
Let us assume that lewd behavior is not bad in any way because of its lewd-
ness and that lewdness is an irreducible property of actions that can figure in 
our best explanations. On the Pragmatic View, (18) would then be true. Now 
let us switch one of our assumptions: All lewd acts are in fact very bad in vir-
tue of transgressing social boundaries on sexual display. On the Pragmatic 
View, (18) would still be true. Since badness is not part of the meaning or 
truth-conditions of “lewd,” simply endorsing (18) on either evaluative as-
sumption cannot by itself commit one to nonreductive naturalism, and the 
same goes for other explanations employing thick terms. 
One might think that the evaluative information conveyed through 
pragmatic mechanisms is still present in explanatory contexts such as (18) 
and might be important to the quality of the explanations.16 The problem is 
that the explanation needs to be explicit about this in order for it to have the 
kind of ontological significance necessary for Cornell realism. For example, 
due to shared background knowledge, if a neurosurgeon says to a fellow neu-
rosurgeon “Joe has suffered a lesion to his fusiform gyrus,” this will typically 
communicate that Joe’s ability to recognize faces has been impaired. But talk 
about the fusiform gyrus all you want, you will not vindicate the ontological 
status of facial recognition, unless something like “facial recognition = activi-
ty in the fusiform gyrus” is true. But it is not. Machines can recognize faces 
with no gyri at all, and some argue that the fusiform gyrus does other things 
as well. To get ontological status for psychological phenomena, we need ex-
planations that explicitly appeal to psychological phenomena (e.g., facial 
recognition) that cannot be adequately given without explicit appeal to such 
phenomena (e.g., through talk of gyri). (Indeed, if the explanation could be 
adequately given using purely neurological terms, then this would count 
against nonreductionism.) So in the same way, using descriptive vocabulary to 
talk about character traits cannot secure ontological status for evaluative 
properties, unless the properties ascribed by the descriptive vocabulary are 
identical to some of the properties ascribed by the evaluative vocabulary (i.e., 
unless reductionism is true). It does not matter that speakers associate posi-
tive or negative evaluations with the descriptive properties in question, just 
                                                
16 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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like it does not matter that neurosurgeons associate psychological phenome-
na with certain brain regions. 
To reinforce this point, consider another example. Imagine that the 
speaker from (17), later in the same conversation, utters the following: 
 
(19) SeedCo’s stock price is falling because fewer farmers are planting GMOs. 
 
In the context, the hearer will know that the speaker takes this to be a good 
thing. However, this kind of explanation cannot support Cornell realism, for 
there is no evaluative language explicitly employed in the explanation. A re-
ductionist can thus happily agree to the explanation and the evaluation. In-
deed, the explanatory importance of morally significant phenomena can be ac-
commodated by essentially any metaethical view, and even an error theorist 
could agree with (19). And notice that, in some contexts, a SeedCo executive 
could truthfully utter (19) in such a way that it conveyed a negative evaluation 
of the trend. As this example shows, because the evaluations are not part of 
the meaning of “GMO,” the quality of the explanation is not dependent on 
the associated evaluation. And again, since “GMO,” like “lewd,” is not part 
of our evaluative vocabulary, explanations using “GMO” (or “lewd”) cannot 
support Cornell realism. 
The whole idea of reductive naturalism is that certain properties are Ja-
nus-faced. Sometimes they get cloaked in evaluative language and other times 
they get cloaked in descriptive language, but they remain one and the same 
property. Nonreductive naturalism must disagree. It requires explanations 
that a) employ evaluative language that ascribes evaluative properties that b) 
cannot be reduced to the descriptive properties ascribed by descriptive lan-
guage. If the explanatory language is not inherently evaluative, then it cannot 
serve the role required of it. Thus, if thick terms are not inherently evaluative, 
explanations employing them cannot support nonreductive naturalism. 
This highlights the way in which my argument is different from one that 
might be pursued by a separabilist who endorses Inherently Evaluative. If 
someone who endorsed that view were to argue that only the descriptive 
component of these evaluative terms is relevant to the putative moral expla-
nations, then there would be significant work left to do to explain why the 
evaluative component is not relevant. This would be like showing that expla-
nations that employ psychological predicates (e.g., “facial recognition”) could 
not grant status for irreducible psychological phenomena. On the Pragmatic 
View, in contrast, explanations with thick terms and concepts are not even 
candidate moral explanations, since the thicks are not part of our evaluative 
vocabulary. They are part of our descriptive vocabulary, just as “GMO” is. 
Thus, my argument is analogous to discovering that “facial recognition” is a 
neurophysiological predicate. In that case, explanations employing “facial 
recognition” could not count against someone who thought that psychologi-
cal facts reduce to neurophysiological facts. 
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Notice that one of the strengths of this line of criticism comes from its 
ability to avoid glaring reductive mistakes as well as objectionable reduction-
ism about properties in general. If the Pragmatic View is correct, then we can 
agree that honesty, oppression and lewdness are all irreducible properties that 
figure into the best explanations of various phenomena just like psychologi-
cal states, DNA and so on. Unlike other objections to the explanations prof-
fered by Cornell realists, this line of criticism allows us to agree that, e.g., (1), 
(2), (4) and (5) are all true. We can even grant Sturgeon et al. the truth of 
their considered moral beliefs and still maintain that these fail to be moral ex-
planations, since only thick concepts (which are not inherently evaluative) 
have been employed. 
Of course, given these concessions, it would be possible to turn (1), (2), 
(4) and (5) into moral explanations. We would simply need to adopt a reduc-
tive account according to which goodness, for example, is identified with 
some subset of the descriptive properties such that it is actually present in 
explanations like (1), (2), (4) and (5). If, for example, one endorsed a reduc-
tive account similar to Railton’s (1986) or Harman’s (1977), or the moral 
functionalism of Jackson and Pettit (1995; see also Jackson 1998), then even 
though the terms employed in (1), (2), (4) and (5) are not inherently evalua-
tive, the properties those terms ascribe can be reductively identified with 
evaluative properties, and thus (1), (2), (4) and (5) turn out to be moral ex-
planations after all. Of course, if this strategy were to be pursued, Cornell 
realism would cease to be a nonreductive variety of ethical naturalism, and 
thus would no longer be a unique position. 
If this reductive strategy (or something like it) is not pursued by Cornell 
realists, then it seems they must concede that examples such as (1), (2), (4) 
and (5) really are not moral explanations at all. This would be a perilous 
move to make, however, since the explanations that employ thick concepts 
are the most plausible explanations that have been offered by advocates of 
Cornell realism. It is precisely this plausibility that makes it difficult to deny 
such explanations without making reductive mistakes or endorsing an objec-
tionably reductionist position that forces one to also deny the existence of 
things like psychological states and DNA. This tension is very serious, and 
the upshot is this: If Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View is correct, then Cornell real-
ists cannot retain the most reasonable moral explanations they have offered 
without abandoning their position in favor of reductive naturalism. 
Before moving on, another issue needs to be addressed. Admittedly, lo-
cutions of the form “a good x” – such as “a good teacher” or “a good par-
ent” – appear to be inherently evaluative in meaning and plausibly fall within 
the class of thick terms (in virtue of their descriptive content). One might, 
accordingly, think that explanations employing such phrases might be 
enough to do the trick, even if explanations employing paradigmatic thick 
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concepts are given up on. For example, perhaps we can explain why Joan is 
well adjusted by appealing to the fact that she had good parents.17 
This is a forceful argument. Nevertheless, I do not think that it is 
enough to support a view like Cornell realism. Among other things, it is 
worth noting that these kinds of descriptions can be applied to things that 
are not actually good. For example, one might rightly describe a person as a 
good assassin.18 They are stealthy, do not ask questions, have a high success 
rate, etc. Even if this is the case, assassins are generally not good. 
This suggests that it might be promising to pursue an account of “a 
good x” according to which the goodness in question has something to do 
with efficacy or relevant standards, rather than goodness in an unrestricted 
sense. Rawls (1971: 350-51), for example, offers such an account: “A is a 
good X if and only if A has the properties (to a higher degree than the aver-
age or standard X) which it is rational to want in an X, given what X’s are 
used for, or expected to do, and the like …” If something along these lines is 
the best way to treat locutions of the form “a good x,” then ideal-observer 
theories such as Railton’s or Harman’s are in a good position to handle ex-
planations of this kind. 
 
5. Thin Explanations 
 
What about explanations employing thin concepts like GOOD and WRONG? 
If examples like (3), (6) and (7) are instances of best explanations, and there 
are reasons for thinking that goodness is an irreducible natural property, then 
the present challenge cannot be fatal to Cornell realism, since words like 
“good” and “wrong” are inherently evaluative, if any are. However, I think 
this approach is unpromising. In general, GOOD explanations are really no 
explanation at all, unless they are reductive. 
The core problem is that it is simply not clear that explanations using 
thin evaluative terms can ground interesting counterfactual-supporting gen-
eralizations better than explanations with descriptively rich thick terms. Con-
trast the following two claims: 
 
(3) Mother Teresa’s goodness won her a Nobel Prize. 
(3') Mother Teresa’s selfless charity won her a Nobel Prize. 
 
It seems to me that (3') is an eminently better explanation than (3). There are 
many ways of being good, and it is for her extraordinary exemplification of 
the ways conveyed by (3') that Mother Teresa was awarded the Nobel. Her 
goodness as such, on the other hand, does not tell us very much at all. On top 
of these thick terms, what explanatory good does calling her “good” do for 
us? Perhaps Jim is a good person, too! Knowing this offers no help in pre-
                                                
17 This example is inspired by a suggestion from an anonymous reviewer. 
18 Väyrynen suggests this example (2013: 30. See also 155-56). 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 9, NO. 2 
MORAL EXPLANATIONS, THICK AND THIN 
Brendan Cline 
 16 
dicting whether Jim will win the Nobel Prize. Even knowing that a person is 
very good is of no help. The Nobel committee looks for specific kinds of 
goodness when it makes its decisions, and it is from this knowledge that one 
can get some explanatory leverage.19 
We can do even better. Consider (7).20 Suppose that someone who did 
not know a lot about Woodworth’s character was told that he was no damn 
good. From this, what could be inferred? That he was a bank robber? That 
he was aggressive and frequently committed violent assaults? That he was 
rude in public? That he used his wealth to nefariously influence politics? That 
he was prone to instigate genocidal policies? Apparently none of these things 
follow in Sturgeon’s example, for in fact Woodworth was just somewhat 
cowardly and selfish. And here is the point: Cowardice and selfishness are 
real properties that can explain the behavior in question much more informa-
tively. They are ascribed by thick terms that are not inherently evaluative (cf. 
Sturgeon 2006: 250-51). Adding that Woodworth was no damn good does 
not make our explanation any better. In fact, it strips (7) of the explanatory 
power it would have had if Woodworth were instead described as cowardly 
and selfish. You can similarly watch yourself lose your explanatory grip if you 
try substituting in (irreducible) thin terms for the thick ones in (1), (2), (4) 
and (5), even though each thick term is plausibly construed as ascribing e.g., a 
good-making or wrong-making property. Notice that this situation is the re-
verse of the one with psychological explanations and neurological explana-
tions – the increased explanatory power of psychological explanations over 
neurophysiological explanations is precisely what earned ontological rights 
for psychological states. 
My arguments so far have neglected an important feature of explanation. 
As Brink (1989: 183-84) points out, even scientific hypotheses do not gener-
ate predictions in isolation. Perhaps when conjoined with some auxiliary 
premises GOOD explanations will fare better. To illustrate this very point, 
Brink (1989: 137-38) uses the following example. One might think that good 
people tend to keep their promises even at great personal cost. While this is 
predictively inert in isolation, one might join it with the hypothesis that Ze-
nobia is a good person to predict that Zenobia will keep her promises at 
great personal cost. 
I do not think this helps. Is it not also the case that trustworthy people 
tend to keep their promises? If that is true, why do we need to posit an extra 
irreducible property of goodness? Once again the attribution of irreducible 
                                                
19 One might worry that, if there are many ways of being good, then we are right back at the 
multiple realizability considerations that favored nonreductionism in psychology. However, 
it may well be that the multiple realizability of goodness here is parasitic on the multiple real-
izability of its reduction base. After all, reductionists propose to reduce evaluative properties 
to irreducible, multiply realizable properties. 
20 I take it that the “damn” in “no damn good” is not doing much more than emphasizing 
Woodworth’s badness – akin to “no good at all.” Although expressives like “damn” do ap-
pear to be inherently evaluative (Potts 2003), this does not affect the case. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 9, NO. 2 
MORAL EXPLANATIONS, THICK AND THIN 
Brendan Cline 
 17 
goodness actually impoverishes our explanation here, since it is plausible that 
not all good people are equally trustworthy. Unless we subscribe to an im-
plausibly strong Socratic thesis about the unity of the virtues, attributing 
goodness to people – even particular degrees of goodness – does not help us 
very much for explanatory purposes.21  
These examples illustrate that explanations that appeal to thin concepts 
are extremely flimsy – they can often be improved by jettisoning the thin 
concepts and substituting in more informative thick ones. In general, the thin 
explanations are comparatively imprecise and less relevant to the phenomena 
being explained when compared to thick explanations. In fact, it is reasona-
ble to think that (nonreductive) GOOD explanations are really no explanation 
at all. But, if the Pragmatic View is correct, then thin moral explanations are 
the only ones that can support Cornell realism. This amounts to a substantial 
challenge to the view. Without a compelling story about thin moral explana-
tions, the appeal of Cornell realism is significantly deflated. 
One might worry that my arguments have been too dismissive of the 
value of the generality that GOOD explanations might offer. Perhaps good-
ness could be explanatorily relevant because it programs for the presence of 
other causally relevant properties, and thereby conveys modal information 
that would be lost without such explanations (Jackson and Pettit 1990). For 
example, maybe Woodworth would have exerted a malignant political influ-
ence if he were wealthy. 
Even if there were GOOD explanations that were good for these reasons, 
it is less clear that these must favor nonreductive naturalism over reductive 
naturalism. Consider that, when reduction is appropriate, one can substitute 
co-referential terms (outside of intensional contexts) and maintain explanato-
ry adequacy. For example, “She died because she stopped drinking water” 
and “She died because she stopped drinking H2O” appear to be explanatorily 
on par for those in possession of the relevant identity.22 While it might be 
difficult for reductive naturalists to offer the precision of explanations that 
employ thick terms without using those terms, it is not clear that they are un-
able to make headway with explanations that employ thin terms and con-
cepts. For example, one might think that moral goodness leads to a flourish-
ing life, but that appealing to specific kinds of moral goodness would fail to 
adequately capture this general fact.23 Although it would not be equivalent in 
                                                
21 Alex King has suggested to me that perhaps if a being were all-good, then this point may 
not hold. I am inclined to agree, but it seems that this fails to tell against the reductionist in 
favor of nonreductionism (see below). 
22 Or consider Jackson and Pettit’s (1990) classic example of a program explanation in which 
they account for the breaking of a glass container by appealing to the increased temperature 
of the water inside, rather than tracking the movements of individual molecules. Notice that 
the explanation would be just as good (for those aware of the relevant theory) if we switched 
out “temperature of the water” for “average kinetic energy of the water molecules,” since 
these traits are identical. 
23 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point and offering this 
example. 
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meaning, it is not clear that someone like Harman or Railton could not offer 
the same explanation in terms of the consequences of doing what one’s ideal-
ly reasoning self would prescribe. Plausibly, following such prescriptions 
would lead to a flourishing life. 
As I suggested, this kind of approach might not be effective for all of 
the explanations employing thick terms, such as greed and kindness. But if 
my earlier arguments are on track, then reductive naturalists need only worry 
about explanations that employ a handful of concepts – namely the thin ones 
(which are often analyzed in terms of one another).24 So even if there are 
good GOOD explanations, there is still more work to do to show that Cornell 
realism is preferable to reductive naturalism. Thus, even if my arguments 
against thin explanations are not definitive, the loss of thick explanations is a 




Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View of thick concepts essentially changes the debate 
between reductive and nonreductive moral naturalists by slimming down the 
class of evaluative language. I have argued that this tips the scales in favor of 
reductionism and against nonreductionism because it disqualifies the most 
plausible moral explanations from the debate, leaving available to Cornell 
realists only their least plausible examples. 
I conclude that the viability of Cornell realism significantly depends up-
on the correct account of the semantics of thick concepts. In order for the 
view to be plausible, proponents need to offer a well-motivated account of 
thick concepts that can compete with Väyrynen’s Pragmatic View, or show 
that thin moral explanations are sufficient to earn ontological rights for irre-
ducible moral properties. It remains to be seen whether either can be done.25 
 
Brendan Cline 
University at Buffalo, SUNY 






                                                
24 E.g., Scanlon (1998). This strategy informs the approach to reductionism that Schroeder 
(2007) pursues, although he operates with a somewhat different understanding of reduction-
ism than has been standard in metaethical debates. See also Schroeder (2005). 
25 I am grateful to Ken Shockley and three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful for helpful discussion with Ariane Nomikos 
and an audience at the University at Buffalo. 
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